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For the last two decades, Afghanistan has consistently been listed among the world’s most 
corrupt nations in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. While many 
efforts have been made to discover how corruption might be reduced, the more foundational 
question of ​why ​corruption is so persistent has been pursued far less thoroughly. This discourse 
has been dominated by two generalized views of corruption: the first of these views hold that 
corruption is the result of immutable cultural inferiorities; the second view holds that corruption 
is the result of bad actors who, through their avarice, disrupt an otherwise impartial government. 
I transcend these reductionist views by placing Afghan corruption within its proper historical and 
politico-economic context. I argue that corruption is a hegemonic device that has been 
increasingly necessitated by the contradictions the U.S. invasion has thrust upon the 
nationally-unifying ideology of the past. I then analyze the nature of political corruption and 














Afghan history is often chronicled as successive periods of revolt and wartime punctuated 
by brief spells of peace. While the nation has been of great geostrategic significance for 
centuries, serving as a centerpiece in the Great Game and a major battleground for Great Britain, 
czarist Russia, the Soviet Union, and the United States, what is notable is the great historical 
ignorance with which each invading country entered Afghanistan. For instance, U.S. General 
Stanley McChrystal gave the following explanation of American failures after his tenure in the 
country: 
There was a rich history in Afghanistan—in which the United States had been deeply 
involved—and yet we didn’t really go to school on that. Not only did we not understand 
the culture of Afghanistan, but we did not really understand the players in Afghanistan.​1 
 
This observation is instructive not only when considering the objectives of warfare, but also for 
understanding the causes of corruption. Contemporary observers attempting to explain the 
prevalence of Afghan corruption have relied upon simplistic explanations that are contingent 
upon the prevalence of bad actors or vague references to Afghan culture that obscure the 
importance of political economy. This study will examine the historical role of corruption as a 
hegemonic device that contributed to holding together Afghanistan’s fractious nation. It will then 
examine how the U.S. invasion reoriented Afghanistan’s political landscape by diminishing the 
political utility of Afghanistan’s ideological hegemonic devices and how that preceded the spike 
in corruption that has occurred since Hamid Karzai came to power. 
To provide a historically-substantiated account of Afghan corruption, this paper will be 
structured as follows. Chapter 1 will provide a brief outline of the history of Afghan resistance to 
centralized government and how it manifested a need for a hegemonic state founded upon a 
uniting ideology, coercion, and patrimonial exchanges. Chapter 2 will explore the present 
1 ​McChrystal, and Miklaucic, "An Interview with General (Ret.) Stanley McChrystal." 
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political economy of corruption, challenging the common views of why corruption exists, and 
highlight how the undermining of ideological hegemonic devices after the U.S. invasion fostered 
a reliance upon corruption for the sake of stability. Chapter 3 examines how political corruption 
unites elites behind the national government and transcends the nation’s traditional ethnic 
divides. Chapter 4 examines how administrative corruption is a consequence of political 
corruption and is driven by the national government’s decision to empower stability-producing 
strongmen. As a whole, this approach to understanding corruption aims to explain why it is so 
persistent in Afghanistan; this understanding will also shine a much-needed light on how to 
reduce it. 
 
Chapter 1: The Historical Imperative to Build Hegemony 
Afghanistan is often referred to as the “graveyard of empires.” While this distinction 
proudly boasts the nation's resistance to foreign colonization, it fails to betray the deep influence 
that surrounding foreigners have had on the nation's composition. In the North, Uzbeks forced 
South by the Oxus empire, the Soviet Union, and later the government of Uzbekistan, dominate 
the regional center of Mazar-i-Sharif. Through the Panjshir valleys and in Kabul, Tajiks maintain 
an ethnic base larger than in their nominal country of Tajikistan.​2​ In the mountains of Hazarajat, 
live the Shiite Hazara people, believed to be descendants of Genghis Khan's invading army that 
arrived in the thirteenth century.​3​ Across the South, Pashtuns who once freely navigated the 
Durand Line live in dispersed tribal arrangements. The Afghan constitution recognizes 14 ethnic 
groups: Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, Baloch, Turkmen, Nuristani, Pamiri, Arab, Gujar, 
Brahui, Qizilbash, Aimaq, and Pasha.​4​ Although it is clear Pashtuns constitute at least a plurality 
2 Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, “Tajik.”  
3 Hucal, “Afghanistan: Who Are the Hazaras.”  
4 The World Factbook​, “Afghanistan.”  
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of the population, determining the precise ethnic composition of the country has always been 
controversial.​5​ Yet even the Pashtun plurality is fragile as they are subdivided into Durranis, 
Ghilzais, and Gurghusht and further subdivided into hundreds of distinct clans.​6​ The extent of 
ethnic and tribal antagonisms across the country is succinctly revealed by the often-quoted 
Pashtun proverb: “I against my brothers; my brothers and I against my cousins; my brother, my 
cousins, and I against the rest of the world.”​7​ These tensions have historically been further 
exacerbated by foreign powers who support varying ethnic and tribal factions within Afghanistan 
to further their national interests.  
This diversity has traditionally made Afghanistan’s overwhelmingly rural population 
difficult to govern at a national level. Through the first century of Ahmed Shah Durrani’s 
empire, the central government exerted little influence outside of Kabul and allowed the nation’s 
tribes and local communities to govern themselves as they saw fit. As American journalist Rajiv 
Chandrasekaran explains: 
Afghans exhibited the same sort of rugged self-sufficiency that had characterized early 
American settlers on the western plains. Their lives were contained in villages. They 
married their cousins and spent their lives tending fields and herding goats. They sought 
little from the state, which had little to offer. In return, they wanted to be left alone.​8 
 
Even the term ‘Afghan’ conceals a resistance to centralization and ethnic tension. Contemporary 
Tajik leaders have objected to the inclusion of the term on government identification cards, as it 
was once understood to refer only to Pashtuns.​9 
With these longstanding divisions, creating a dominant state, one that Antonio Gramsci 
defined as “hegemony protected by the armor of coercion,” has proven historically difficult.​10​ All 
5 Barfield, ​Afghanistan,​ 23. 
6 Barfield, ​Afghanistan,​ 25. 
7 Wahab, ​In My Father's Country​, 323. 
8 Chandrasekaran, ​Little America, ​19. 
9 Shalizi, “Who is an Afghan?”  
10 Gramsci, ​Selections from Prison Notebooks,​ 263. 
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modern Afghan leaders have employed a careful combination of coercion and hegemonic 
devices to maintain and centralize their power. These hegemonic devices aim to win the consent 
of those who are ruled over through non-coercive means like the construction of a nationally 
recognized ideology.​11​ Afghan leaders often appeal to historical narratives to win this consent, 
highlighting the state’s role in defending Islam, the legacy of the royal lineage, the necessity of 
repelling foreign invaders, and the legitimizing power of jirgas (councils). Undergirding these 
ideological devices is the distribution of rewards to potential (often ethnic) opposition. A vast 
network of patrimonial exchanges, whereby the head of state redistributes his resources and 
power to pliable tribal leaders, has always been necessary, as the national ideology alone was 
never sufficient to win the consent of Afghanistan’s many tribes. Even at the local level, tribal 
khans redistribute the resources they acquire from the state or market to legitimize their powerful 
position in the community lest they be accused of holding unjustified authority.​12​ Anthropologist 
Whitney Azoy has referred to the historical presence of these exchanges among leaders as a 
“culturally tolerated deviance.” She contrasts that state of affairs with the excessive post-2001 
levels of these exchanges that, under the new form of governance created by the Bonn 
Agreement, are now understood as corruption.​13​ The purpose of this increase in corruption since 
the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan becomes much more evident once the historical context in 
which it arose is presented. 
Throughout the 19th century, Afghanistan’s rulers remained weak and only succeeded in 
mobilizing large amounts of manpower and resources when they were holding back British 
occupiers or opposing their foreign-backed, and therefore viewed as un-Islamic, leaders like the 
11 This interpretation of Gramsci’s concept of hegemony is borrowed from Eagleton, ​Ideology: An 
Introduction​, 112 
12 Rubin, ​The Fragmentation of Afghanistan​, 42. 
13 Wissing, ​Funding the Enemy​, 136. 
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notorious Shah Shuja.​14​ The first ruler to challenge the rural countryside’s dominance was Amir 
Abdul Rehman Khan (1880-1901), Afghanistan’s Iron Emir. However, he carefully limited the 
scope of his reforms largely to issues of taxation and security.​15​ Nonetheless, these narrow 
reforms were met with resistance; only after crushing dozens of rebellions, most notably in 
Bamiyan and Kafiristan, painting the state as the defender of Islam and Pashtuns, and bribing 
numerous tribal leaders was Abdul Rehman able to construct a skeleton of a national 
administrative system.​16​ American scholar Louis Dupree characterized Rehman’s policies as a 
case of “internal imperialism,” highlighting just how intrusive the reforms appeared to the 
formerly autonomous regions across the country.​17​ For the one-hundred years following Abdul 
Rehman’s rule, Afghanistan’s leaders consistently struggled to maintain the quasi-centralized 
state Rehman built. Instead of humbling themselves in the face of persistent opposition, these 
leaders fought to expand the scope of governmental authority, albeit with little success. The 
result was consistent instability and infighting among the narrow band of Pashtun elites who 
fought to control the nation. Consequently, every leader since Abdul Rehman, up until Hamid 
Karzai left office in 2014, has been forcefully removed from office. 
Abdul Rehman’s grandson, Amanullah, attempted to build upon his grandfather’s 
powerful legacy. He attempted to consolidate state control using many of the previously 
discussed hegemonic devices. Upon taking the throne, he railed against British influence, 
launched the Third Anglo-Afghan War, and called upon tribes along the southern border to wage 
jihad against the British. After winning independence, Amanullah pursued an array of ambitious 
reforms, tackling issues from education to child marriage to the treatment of women. As the 
14 Barfield, ​Afghanistan, ​121-123. 
15 Barfield, ​Afghanistan,​173.  
16 Barfield, ​Afghanistan,​155.  
17 Dupree, ​Afghanistan. 2nd ed.,​ xix. 
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peripheries outside of Kabul became increasingly fed up with these intrusions, Amanullah held a 
Loya jirga (grand council) to legitimize his authority. Instead, the jirga’s delegates rejected his 
modernist outlook and the country devolved into civil war.​18 
The next trial of centralization would proceed a half-century later as a flurry of 
Soviet-supported Marxist leaders attempted to radically transform Afghanistan. The first of these 
leaders, Muhammad Daoud, set out to transform all aspects of the country: security, taxation, the 
treatment of women, land ownership, the local economy, and the role of the religious 
establishment. He intended to destroy the decentralized nature of Afghan society in order to 
implement his communist agenda.​19​ After Daoud was ousted from power, the Soviets invaded 
and installed numerous puppet leaders. Instead of appealing to Afghan society, these leaders 
rejected Afghan tradition in favor of a Marxist ideological vanguard —led by Soviets advisers 
and their Afghan proxy, the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan​20​—and relied on the sheer 
strength of the Soviet military occupation to maintain their rule. When asked about his popular 
support by Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin, President Nur Muhammad Taraki reported that 
“There is no active support [for the government] on the part of the population.”​21​ This strategy 
backfired as one of the earliest Soviet reforms, a compulsory literary campaign for women in 
1979, resulted in large mutinies from the Afghan Army, including Ismael Khan’s massive 
Afghan 17th Division.​22​ As the state became an enemy of its alleged constituency, many Afghans 
resisted as mujahideen (holy warriors), fighting the Soviet army with American weapons and aid 
18 Barfield, ​Afghanistan, ​185-188. 
19 Friedman, ​Terrorism, Afghanistan, and War​, 75. 
20 Despite their attempts at forming a vanguard, the PDPA contained serious internal divisions most notably 
between the Khalq (people) and Parcham (flag) factions which briefly split before being persuaded to reunify after 
pressure from the Soviet-led international communist movement. These divisions are discussed by Rubin, ​The 
Fragmentation of Afghanistan​, 122-145. 
21 Gaddis, ​The Cold War, ​210. 
22 Yousaf, ​Afghanistan--the Bear Trap​, 56-57.  
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funneled through Pakistan.​23​ By the end of the Soviet occupation, over one million Afghans had 
been killed; the state structure had been decimated; regional commanders gained prominence 
across the country, and millions of Afghan refugees had fled across the nation's borders primarily 
into Pakistan and Iran.​24​ The last Soviet-backed leader, Najibullah, struggled to hold power after 
the Soviets left Afghanistan. For the final years of his rule, his “national reconciliation” program 
distributed cash to local security forces and defecting commanders. Due to his affiliation with the 
Soviets, Najibullah had no claim to Afghanistan’s hegemonic narratives and had no choice but to 
rely upon simple patrimonial exchanges. As Soviet aid dried up, this redistribution strategy 
proved insufficient to hold power. Instead, it induced severe inflation and led to his departure a 
few years later.​25 
Abandoned by their foreign benefactors after the Soviet defeat, the alliance between the 
seven Afghan mujahideen parties quickly fragmented. The Soviets' policy of murdering tribal 
elders across the country left the mujahideen commanders (warlords) to compete for dominance 
in the anarchic post-Najibullah environment.​26​ These warlords, despised for their mercilessness 
and corruption, ruled over their territories with impunity. The most powerful figures included 
Abdul Rashid Dostum based in Mazar-i-Sharif; Ahmed Shah Massoud in Panjshir; Ismael Khan 
in Herat; and Burhanuddin Rabbani as the ostensible leader in Kabul. In the South, power was 
even further decentralized as no single Pashtun leader emerged to rule Kandahar and the 
surrounding provinces. Instead, in 1994, a new movement emerged. The Taliban (students), 
consisting of many veterans of the Soviet war and refugees that were educated in Pakistani 
madrassas (seminary schools), hoped to bring an end to the corruption and excesses of warlords 
23 Yousaf, ​Afghanistan--the Bear Trap​, 77. 
24 Byman, ​Deadly Connections​, 189-190. 
25 Rubin, ​Afghanistan from Cold War Through the War on Terror​, 56. 
26 Gopal, ​No Good Men, ​75. 
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by governing according to their Deobandi understanding of Islam.​27​ By many accounts they 
succeeded, reducing the number of obtrusive checkpoints along roadways, providing security 
against warlords, and reducing overall crimes.​28​ Regardless, the Taliban’s authoritarian rule was 
their most distinguishing feature. Their leader, Mullah Omar, the self-proclaimed ​Amir-ul 
Momineen (Commander of the Faithful), sidelined local shuras and relied solely on the advice of 
the Kandahar Shura until even its opinion proved too difficult to accommodate.​29​ Omar’s 
totalitarian rule rivaled even the imperialism of the Soviets. His strict interpretation of Sharia law 
prohibited Western music, videos, dancing, playing cards, television, and education for women.​30 
Across the nation, the Taliban’s intolerance of Afghanistan’s natural diversity was observable in 
the oppression of women in Herat and Kabul, the targeted killings of Shiite Hazaras in 
Mazar-i-Sharif, and the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas.  
By 2001, the Taliban movement had taken control of over 90% of the country; the last 
holdout was Ahmed Shah Massoud’s stronghold in the Panjshir valleys.​31​ Although the Taliban 
disregarded the importance of Afghanistan’s traditions, of which they knew little, they were able 
to dominate the country by relying upon the support of Osama bin Laden and his Afghan Arabs, 
foreign volunteers, and most importantly, Pakistan. In essence, the Taliban had a greater affinity 
with its foreign sponsors than the nation it was trying to conquer. As Pakistan journalist Ahmed 
Rashid describes: 
Many of them [Taliban] had been born in Pakistani refugee camps, educated in Pakistani 
madrassas, and had learnt their fighting skills from Mujaheddin parties based in Pakistan. 
As such the younger Taliban barely knew their own country or history, but from their 
madrassas they learnt about the ideal Islamic society created by the Prophet Mohammed 
1,400 years ago and this is what they wanted to emulate.​32 
27 Esposito, ​The Islamic Threat​, 264-265. 
28 Rubin, ​The Fragmentation of Afghanistan​, xvi.  
29 Rashid, ​Taliban​, 102.  
30 Rashid, ​Taliban​, 2. 
31 Maizland, and Laub, "The Taliban in Afghanistan." 




 Although in their inception this dynamic provided many Afghans hope that the Taliban could 
unite the country and transcend the nation’s history of ethnic factionalism, these hopes were 
quickly dashed. The Taliban ruled by force and carefully distributed payments to tribal leaders 
that proved amenable, a tactic they likely gleaned from Afghanistan’s previous rulers.​33 
Although the U.S. relationship with the Taliban had been deteriorating since American 
diplomats and activist organizations called attention to the Taliban’s treatment of women and 
Osama bin Laden’s 1998 attacks on the United States’ embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, only 
the September 11th attacks on the World Trade Center would convince the United States to 
intervene in Afghan affairs. With a ground force of 2,500 troops and a massive air campaign, the 
United States, working in a coalition with the Northern Alliance of Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara 
commanders, was able to oust the Taliban from power by December 2001.​34​ It then became the 
challenge of the United States and its coalition partners to pick up the pieces of war-torn 
Afghanistan while continuing to combat a Taliban resurgence. 
Throughout modern Afghan history, certain trends persist. Ethnic and tribal factionalism 
has divided the country into semi-autonomous regions; only the nationally transcendent 
mandates to repel foreigners and protect the state’s Islamic character have united the state’s 
myriad factions around Pashtun rulers. Skepticism toward ambitious, centralizing leaders is also 
a constant among rural, particularly non-Pashtun, peoples. Leaders from Abdul Rehman to 
Mullah Omar reacted to this environment by fortifying their leadership with what Gramsci 
described as “hegemony protected by the armor of coercion.” While coercion was the dominant 
strategy of the Soviet-backed leaders and Mullah Omar, leaders lacking outside military 
assistance could never hope to dominate the country by force and were forced to build 
33 Friedman, ​Terrorism, Afghanistan, and War,​ 197. 
34 ​Military Times, ​“A Timeline of U.S. Troop Levels.” 
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hegemony. For example, Amanullah’s primary means of building hegemony was by cultivating 
historical narratives and a nascent nationalism. Leaders who could neither dominate through 
force nor build ideological hegemony were forced to rely on corruption, the tactic of leaders for 
whom “coercion is too dangerous and consent is too ineffectual.”​35​ The most striking example of 
this phenomenon prior to the American invasion is under the presidency Najibullah, whose 
distribution of Soviet aid through his “national reconciliation” program was all that kept him in 
power after the Soviet withdrawal. The American-backed presidents —Karzai and Ghani— have 
been similarly reliant on corruption to build hegemony. As was the case with Najibullah, many 
observers worry a cessation of aid would lead to a collapse of the government.​36  
It is this long history, or rather the American neglect of it, that has led to the blunders of 
American state-building efforts in Afghanistan. Corruption is now endemic to Afghan politics 
and has been one of the largest issues perturbing Afghans since the signing of the Bonn 
Agreement. As of 2019, approximately 68% of Afghans felt corruption was a major problem in 
their daily life.​37​ Anti-corruption journalist Sarah Chayes has described it as a mechanism that is 
“manufacturing Taliban [support]” and a threatening “matter of national security.”​38​ This threat 
is best understood not as a result of the greed of warlords and other bad actors, nor as a cultural 
deficiency among Afghans, but as a political attempt to maintain a hegemonic state in an 
exceptionally constrained political environment where neither coercion nor a common ideology 
is readily available. The “culturally tolerated deviance” of the past has been transformed into an 
intolerable, all-encompassing system of corruption due to the destruction of Afghanistan’s 
35 Chase-Dunn, “Hegemony and Social Change,” 366. 
36 Rubin, “An Ailing America.” 
Barnett Rubin, a leading expert on Afghanistan, recently made the case for continuing aid to Afghanistan by citing 
the fall of Najibullah as a perilous reminder of what can happen when Afghan governments are abandoned by their 
foreign sponsors.  
37 Akseer, et. al., "A Survey of the Afghan People.” 
38 Chayes, ​Thieves of State​, 6-7. 
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national ideological narratives and the massive amounts of American wealth introduced into 
Afghanistan’s traditionally patrimonial style of governance.  
 
Chapter 2: Corruption as a Hegemonic Device 
Corruption is often described as a modern construct. The patrimonial dynasties of the past 
had no norms of good governance or external standards to which they could be held, thus, they 
could not be considered corrupt, perhaps with exception of being corrupted by a foreign 
influence.​39​ As a result, our understanding of corruption must be contextual. When Amir Abdul 
Rehman distributed money to tribal leaders to keep them from revolting, this was in line with 
political norms and even seen as charitable compared to the alternative of crushing their revolt. 
However, when Hamid Karzai repeatedly distributed state assets to potential opponents, this was 
understood as corruption and drew the ire of Afghans and foreign backers. In other words, 
corruption occurs where there is a gap between expectations and reality. The failure of the 
Afghan government to meet the high expectations that accompanied Western state-building 
efforts have produced a political culture that is perceived as rife with corruption. Given this fluid 
understanding of corruption, how can we understand its causes in contemporary Afghanistan? 
Two common reductionist views have competed for dominance among those with a stake in 
Afghanistan’s future. The first views corruption as a cultural deficiency among Afghans; the 
second, as the consequence of bad actors who refuse to relinquish their hold on power. While 
both of these views hold kernels of truth, they miss why corruption has been so abundant at all 
levels of government since the Karzai administration.  
The cultural view of corruption pessimistically asserts that corruption is in some way 
endemic to Afghan culture. Consequently, actors hoping to improve the country’s governance 
39 Fukuyama, "Corruption as a Political Phenomenon,” 52. 
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should tolerate an inevitable level of corruption from their politicians. Proponents of this view 
recall the very history of patrimonial exchange that I have discussed in Chapter 1. Furthermore, 
they might recall the nation’s history of wasita (connections) culture, highlighting the role of 
nepotism, middlemen, political marriages, and the exchange of favors for a ruler to maintain 
power.​40​ U.S. General David Petreaus epitomized this view when he pronounced that corruption 
had been a part of Afghan culture for “however long this country has probably been in 
existence.”​41​ But this attitude fails to recognize historical changes in the scale of corruption and 
Afghans’ varying responses to these changes. Afghans clearly reject the idea of corruption as a 
cultural constant. Petreaus’s offhand comment drew considerable outrage and, since the 
beginning of his counterinsurgency strategy, over 90% of Afghans have viewed corruption as a 
problem in their country.​42​ While the cultural view of corruption may recognize an important, 
albeit limited, historical context, it is largely, as U.S. General H.R. McMaster concluded, 
“bigotry masquerading as cultural sensitivity.​43​ Corruption is far more than a quirk of Afghan 
culture; it is a universal political tool that’s presence has been exacerbated by the unique 
circumstances of Afghan politics since the U.S. invasion.  
The view of corruption emphasizing bad actors takes a different approach. It begins with 
the axiomatic and rather circular proposition that corruption is common because there are a lot of 
people participating in corruption.​44​ Proponents of this view greatly resent the culture of 
tufangsalari (rule by the gun) that provides impunity for warlords and corrupt politicians.​45​ Given 
40 Rubin, ​Afghanistan from the Cold War Through the War on Terror,​ 164-165. 
41 Peter, “Petraeus Comments on Corruption.”  
42 Akseer et. al., "A Survey of the Afghan People.” 
43 Partlow, ​A Kingdom of Their Own​, 153. 
44 The term ‘bad actor’ is generally applied to those who act against the interest of the state for their own 
benefit. Oftentimes the terms ‘warlord,’ and ‘local strongman’ are employed to communicate the same thing within 
a more narrow context. However, what constitutes a bad actor is rarely objectively defined. The use of this rhetoric 
is critiqued by ​Giustozzi, "'Good' State vs.'Bad' Warlords?” 
45 Rubin, ​Afghanistan from the Cold War Through the War on Terror​, 127-128. 
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the immense power of the president in Afghan politics, those blaming bad actors for 
Afghanistan’s ills are quick to highlight the shortcomings of President Karzai in addressing 
corruption within his government. Former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, Karl Eikenberry 
referred to Karzai as “not an adequate strategic partner.”​46​ Additionally, U.S. Special Envoy for 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke, consistently lobbied against Karzai during the 
2009 presidential election, citing his incompetence, among other reasons.​47​ In essence, this view 
understands corruption as an act of will, a free choice made by greedy opportunists and 
plunderers who dominate the country. But is it true that Hamid Karzai was willfully corrupt? His 
fierce protestations against corruption within his cabinet might be best understood as political 
theatre but his family has appeared genuinely frustrated with and willing to mock his ascetic 
ways and disinterest in money. As his cousin (which, conveniently, is the same word as ‘enemy’ 
in Pashto) Hashim confessed: 
He doesn’t want any of his relatives to get rich… He wants us to live in, what you call it, 
a soup kitchen? Or live in a shrine. Or an orphanage. Something like this. You tell him 
‘Oh, I saw your cousin, he’s a big businessman in Dubai. He owns a hotel’. He’ll be very 
upset. If you tell him, ‘I met your cousin, he’s living in a shrine, he’s smoking tobacco 
and he doesn’t have any money for his food,’ he’ll say, ‘Oh, what a great guy!’​48 
 
To those viewing corruption as an act of free will, these candid moments must be disregarded. 
To those who think this way, Karzai was a greatly-empowered president who, despite the ability 
to tackle corruption, allowed it to persist. Accordingly, an honest technocratic president who 
would promote transparency and accountability in good faith could solve Afghanistan’s 
corruption problem. To many advocates of reform, former Finance Minister, and President, 
Ashraf Ghani best fit this role.​49​ Yet, even he had felt it necessary to appoint notorious warlord 
46 Gall, ​The Wrong Enemy​, 202. 
47 Coll, ​Directorate S, ​379. 
48 Partlow, ​A Kingdom of Their Own​, 165. 
49 Packer, “Afghanistan’s Theorist-in-Chief.”  
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Abdul Rashid Dostum as his running mate in his 2014 presidential campaign and as president 
has struggled to curb corruption.​50​ Even the greatest advocates for reform must cooperate with 
bad actors or linger in obscurity. Realizing this folly, some have advocated increasing the 
capacity of the government so that politicians could draw legitimacy from their competency 
rather than from their associations with illegitimate actors such as warlords, criminals, etc.​51 
However, it has been noted that state legitimacy does not necessarily follow an increase in 
capacity absent other changes.​52​ Efforts to expand the scope of the Afghan state have only bred 
greater corruption and resentment. The unbridled faith in the well-meaning individual possessed 
by those who solely blame bad actors for Afghanistan’s corruption has provided little insight, as 
no single major politician has been able to transcend Afghanistan’s corrupted politics. 
Despite the immense power the Afghan presidency carries, Karzai, like any politician, 
was bound by many constraints, especially given the vast power of informal and foreign actors in 
his country. When pressured by his foreign supporters to remove Sher Mohammed Akhundazai 
from the governorship of Helmand in 2005, Karzai relented but posed a poignant question: “Do 
you want a bad guy on your side or working for the Taliban?”​53​ This question, while excusing 
corruption, elucidates a realpolitik that is essential to maintaining control over the country. The 
Taliban was far from Karzai’s only constraint. Even more importantly, he was deprived of all of 
the past ideological narratives that served to legitimize the rule of his predecessors. Corruption in 
contemporary Afghanistan is best understood within this context. It is a hegemonic device that 
becomes dominant when the use of national ideological narratives and coercion becomes 
ineffective. It is not an act of complete free will nor cultural determinism. Acts of corruption in 
50 Rosenberg, “Technocrat to Afghan Populist.” 
51 This argument is expounded by Ghani, and Lockhart, ​Fixing Failed States​, 115-166. 
52 Fukuyama, ​State-building​, 26. 
53 Chandrasekaran, ​Little America, ​85. 
 
17 
Afghanistan are politico-economic, pragmatic decisions made within tight constraints to hold 
together a fragile, ethnically diverse, traditionally decentralized, and now foreign-backed state 
when the national ideology of the past has lost political utility. 
The structure of Afghanistan’s state, created in the Constitutional Loya Jirga of 2003, 
exhibited a belief that Afghanistan’s historical constraints could be easily overcome. The 
Americans present at the jirga supported a strong central government that could stabilize the 
nation and prevent it from again becoming a base for terrorism but neglected the traditional 
sources of legitimacy in Afghan governance. While many Afghans, contrary to historical 
precedent, were willing to accept a strong centralized government if it resulted in peace, they 
have since soured on the idea due to its lack of results.​54​ Lacking resources, authority, and his 
own army, Karzai relied on alliances of convenience with American-allied warlords, 
drug-dealers, and other local powerbrokers to maintain control over the country. His reliance on 
American security, even in his own palace, epitomizes the strict constraints on Karzai’s decision 
making. Hamid Karzai was neither a cultural given nor a bad actor but a, relatively, rational 
political actor who relied upon corruption, which conferred upon him the approval of necessary 
powerbrokers, when all the ideological sources of hegemony were absent. These ideological 
sources of hegemony, narratives structured around repelling foreign invaders, protecting Islam, 
respecting royal lineage, and holding consensus-building jirgas, were inaccessible to Karzai, and 
the loss of all four of these narratives deserves examination.  
The Karzai government’s poverty and lack of an army or tax base forced it to be reliant 
upon rather than opposed to foreign intervention. Scholars have noted that Karzai’s reliance upon 
donor aid for both his development and operational budget characterized a willingness to “accept 
54 Goodson, "Afghanistan in 2003,” 14-22. 
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this state of dependency as a long-term prospect.”​55​ From the United States alone, the Afghan 
government has received billions of dollars in assistance, not accounting for the billions in 
“off-budget” aid given to donor-driven projects.​56​ This dependency forced Karzai to tolerate the 
actions of the U.S. military and corrupt USAID contractors even when those actions highly 
offended Afghan sympathies. A telling example comes from the U.S.’ drone strike campaign, 
Operation Haymaker. The vast majority of those killed in this campaign were not intended 
targets but were still labeled by the American military as “Enemies Killed in Action.”​57​ In 
response to the numerous cases of civilian casualties, often ignored by U.S. diplomats, Karzai 
was only able to provide statements of frustration, condemnation, and sorrow, urging his backers 
in Washington to exercise greater caution.​58​ This allowed Taliban propagandists to portray him 
as —and many ordinary Afghans to see him as—an American puppet, a twenty-first-century 
Shah Shuja.​59 
Despite their many differences, Islam has often unified Afghans but Karzai was unable to 
translate this hegemonic device into political capital because of the political constraints he faced. 
Ninety-nine point seven percent of the Afghan population are Muslims. Among these 
approximately 87% are Sunni and 13% are Shiite and the Islamic character of the state has 
always been respected; even the Afghan Constitution recognizes Islam as the state religion, 
despite the state’s growing secularism.​60​ Yet many factors discredited Karzai’s status as an 
Islamic leader. Karzai’s association with the United States and willingness to allow non-Muslims 
55 Giustozzi, "Afghanistan: Transition without End.”  
56 United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “Key Points — SFRC Report.” 
57 Scahill, ​The Assassination Complex​, 155-157. 
58 ​CNN, ​“Karzai Calls Civilian Casualties Unacceptable.”  
The Karzai administration repeatedly remarked on its lack of input regarding American airstrikes. Karzai’s 
spokesman, Aimal Faizi, once lamented, “We do not have joint airstrikes,... It is unilateral when it comes to an 
airstrike.” This quote can be accessed in the CNN article cited above. 
59 Neumann, “Failed Relations.”  
60 ​The World Factbook​, “Afghanistan.”  
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to maintain an army in a Muslim country was a point of controversy. Karzai was also haunted by 
his lack of response to American troops found disrespecting Islamic values. These included 
negligent U.S. bombings against a wedding in Uruzgan, preventing the immediate burial of 
martyred Muslims, taking photographs of deceased and naked Afghan women,​61​ and instances 
where copies of the Holy Quran were burned by U.S. military personnel.​62​ Additionally, the 
sidelining of village mullahs and religious judges in the political process made the state, in the 
eyes of many, Islamic in name only.​63​ These choices largely represented an American desire for 
an increasingly secular and democratic Afghan government rather than an Afghan change in 
preferences away from religious governance.​64 
Although Karzai possessed a semblance of royal lineage as a Durrani Pashtun, justifying 
his rule based on monarchical tradition proved difficult as the previous king, Mohammad Zahir 
Shah, although elderly, was still alive and enjoyed nostalgic support from many Afghans.​65​ Zahir 
Shah’s support from the Rome Group at the Emergency Loya Jirga of 2002 also made him a 
serious contender for leadership. However, he was reportedly forced to withdraw his bid for the 
presidency by then-Defense Minister Marshal Fahim and U.S. Special Envoy Zalmay 
Khalilzad.​66​ This lack of royal legitimacy made the Loya jirga essential to Karzai’s rise. Yet this 
tradition, too, was spoiled by foreign interference. The 2002 Loya Jirga, meant to designate the 
leader of Afghanistan, consisted of actors from across Afghan society. Broad contingents of 
Afghan society came together to determine Afghanistan’s new leader, including royalty, Sufi 
leaders, warlords, and feminists. Unbeknownst to them, their future had already been decided; 
the predetermined nature of the Loya jirga became abundantly clear when Hamid Karzai, then 
61 Fisk, ​The Great War for Civilisation​, 897. 
62 Whitlock, “U.S. Troops Tried to Burn 500 Korans.”  
63 ​Pandya and Laipson, “Islam and Politics​.” 
64 Pandya and Laipson, “​Islam and Politics.” 
65 Hanifi, "Editing the Past,” 320 
66 Leupp, “Karzai’s Bodyguard,” 143-146.  
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still in Kandahar holding back the Taliban, was allowed to make a speech via satellite phone to 
the jirga and received the consistent advocacy of American and European sponsors of the jirga.​67 
Any legitimacy Karzai gained from the jirgas dissipated quickly, given its extraordinary public 
and compromised nature. As scholar Jamil Hanifi notes: 
The internationalization of the 2002 and 2003–2004 Loya Jergas made this hegemonic 
assembly transparent and open to critical scrutiny by outsiders. For the first time in its 
history this tool of deception was exposed for what it really is—a consent-producing 
machinery constructed out of colonial misrepresentations unrelated to the Paxtuns, 
Afghan tribes, or tribalism, and independent of the wishes and aspirations of the people 
of Afghanistan.​68 
 
With the narrative devices of the past unavailable, Karzai’s government relied on the 
traditional, although now differently understood, tactic of distributing rewards to potential 
adversaries to maintain control. His great formal power as the nation’s executive allowed him to 
empower and co-opt potential challengers into his administration and the national ministries. 
Simultaneously, the president’s limited informal power outside of Kabul necessitated the 
delegation of power to warlords and other extralegal actors at the local level.​69​ As a result, 
corruption has manifested in two forms: the first form, political corruption, refers to corruption 
by high-level government officials and highlights the misuse of state assets to enrich and 
increase their own power, the power of family members, or other politically influential actors 
wherein; the second form, administrative corruption, can be understood as a state-facilitated 
variation of tufangsalari, whereby a combination of local administrators, authorities, and 
warlords employ their monopoly of force to spend state assets without accountability and extort 
the populations that live under them.​70​ This corruption is often silently facilitated by the national 
67 Wissing, ​Funding the Enemy​, 43. 
68 Hanifi, "Editing the Past," 319. 
69 Bacevich, ​America's War​, 298.  
70 This distinction between political and administrative corruption is made across studies of corruption in 
Afghanistan. My definitions are loosely borrowed from the following source: United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime, “Corruption in Afghanistan.” The term “grand corruption” is often used synonymously with political 
corruption. The term “petty corruption” is also used to describe administrative corruption. 
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government as it turns a blind eye to predatory behavior in exchange for recognition of its 
authority. An implicit agreement between the national government and regional power brokers 
exists in which they agree not to resist one another too strongly. The non-stop extortion of 
monetary baksheesh (bribes), tolls, and properties is characteristic of the administrative 
corruption that personally impacts Afghans as they go about their daily lives. The study of these 
two forms of corruption, how they relate, and how they maintain the hegemonic power of the 
Afghan government without the explicit use of force will be the focus of the next two chapters of 
this work. 
 
Chapter 3: Political Corruption: Sharing the Spoils of National Power 
While every country deals with some level of political corruption, the scale of its 
presence in Afghanistan has led to cynicism towards, and in many cases a rejection of, the entire 
government. The stories of political corruption in Afghanistan are frequently reported in 
American newspapers and Afghanistan’s TOLOnews. The hundreds of investigations detailing 
the Afghan government’s misallocation of foreign aid, meticulously documented by journalists 
and in reports by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), have 
led donor governments to give an increasing proportion of their aid to “off-budget” projects 
managed by private contractors rather than the Afghan government. These investigations focus 
on the waste of Afghanistan’s most powerful: the elites who find themselves the recipients of 
American largesse. For these national elites, corruption is not simply waste but a state-building 
strategy in itself. Pillaging and carefully distributing state resources has helped guarantee support 
for the government from elites representing diverse spheres of the country. This pillaging 
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manifests itself in many innovative ways that attempt to avoid the scrutiny of international 
auditors. Despite this, political corruption often follows the same broad structural process: 
 
1. Political positions are awarded based on considerations other than merit.  
2. The wealth of the state is distributed for illegitimate purposes.  
3. Perpetrators maintain impunity in a system lacking accountability measures and 
impartial arbiters of the law. 
 
 It is these three phenomena that together compose the whole of political corruption and will be 
observed in this chapter. Together, they unite Afghanistan’s elite toward the common goal of 
maintaining, although often not developing, a hegemonic Afghan state.  
A common method of political corruption, often ignored by foreign observers in 
deference to Afghan sovereignty, consists of the appointments of politicians to government 
offices. Under the Afghan Constitution, the president appoints all governors at the provincial and 
district levels, allowing him to coerce and micromanage politics at even the most local level. In 
making these decisions, President Karzai and his closest advisors were mired in “a complex web 
of multi-layered negotiations, promises, and pay-offs”​71​ that aimed to increase their relative 
power, prevent Taliban incursions, and maintain regional and national harmony. Leaders that 
could provide stability were tolerated, regardless of their other activities. One such leader, Abdul 
Raziq Achakzai, former governor of Spin Boldak and later Kandahar police chief, was known for 
receiving kickbacks from customs revenues, drug smuggling, extrajudicial killings, and torture, 
and he received consistent support and promotions from President Karzai.​72​ Conversely, 
71 Mukhopadhyay, “Provincial Governors in Afghan Politics.” 
72 Bowman, “He Calmed Kandahar.” 
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strongmen who might not cooperate often find themselves removed from their spheres of 
influence. Provincial and district-level officials are frequently imported into their province of 
duty from remote parts of the country and given minimal resources in an attempt to minimize 
their effectiveness. As of 2016, for example, two-thirds of district governors lacked office 
buildings and other basic supplies.​73​ This serves to alienate constituents from their subnational 
sources of representation, weaken the power of tribal leaders now removed from their peoples, 
and make governors dependent upon national resources. Subnational officials find themselves 
dependent upon the national government for budgets and aid contracts that are near exclusively 
channeled through Kabul.​74  
Appointments to national positions often endure the same corrupt bargaining process as 
governors, but the objective of balancing the ethnic composition of government gains 
importance. Rather than implementing selection criteria based upon national political appeal or 
competence, positions are doled out to shore up support from the leaders of the nation’s minority 
communities. Since the adoption of the 2004 constitution, Afghanistan’s president has always 
been a Pashtun; its first vice president, a Tajik, or Uzbek in the exceptional case of General 
Abdul Rashid Dostum; its second vice president, a Hazara. Tajiks, as the nation’s largest 
minority group and one that was crucial in driving the Taliban out of Afghanistan in 2001, have 
received particular clout in the nation’s bureaucracy. After Karzai became president, the nation’s 
most powerful ministries —defense, interior, intelligence, and foreign— were all placed under 
the control of lieutenants of Ahmed Shah Massoud, the famous Panjshiri (Tajik) commander.​75 
After a dispute between Karzai and Tajik leaders over demonstrations that turned violent in the 
North, some Tajiks in the Defense Ministry were replaced by members of rival Northern 
73 Partlow, ​A Kingdom of Their Own, ​17-25. 
74 Chene, “U4 Expert Answer.” 
75 Partlow, ​A Kingdom of Their Own,​ 61. 
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Alliance groups, further highlighting the open ethnicization of national political appointments.​76 
Despite these occasional bureaucratic skirmishes, collusion in the pursuit of power between 
Afghanistan’s ethnic elites ensures everyone’s continued participation in the nation’s corruption 
networks by guaranteeing them an adequate share of the spoils. 
These spoils have primarily come from the billions of dollars of reconstruction aid that 
the U.S. and other foreign governments have provided the Afghan government.​77​ ​Both U.S. 
generals and development officials, many following the prescriptions of counterinsurgency 
strategy, were convinced that investing huge sums of money in infrastructure projects would win 
the war against the Taliban; the budgets were so large that the Pentagon could not even spend 
everything it was allocated.​78​ ​As the SIGAR John Sopko notes, corrupt officials and warlords 
“dip their hands into the streams of cash pouring into a small and fragile economy.”​79​ U.S. aid 
has been so bountiful and unrelenting that it has incentivized corruption. Foreign largesse, 
combined with a lack of transparency and donor oversight, boosted the salaries and prestige of 
U.S. private contractors and Afghanistan’s politicians but has had an underwhelming impact on 
Afghanistan’s development. 
Making aid dollars disappear has become something of an art for Afghanistan’s officials; 
embezzlement takes many forms and has been difficult to track. The presence of ghost workers 
on the government payroll is one of the most common. These ghosts can be teachers, students, 
police, soldiers, or even whole schools. These people, or buildings, although fictitious, are 
reported to exist, allocated salaries or funding, and then these funds are misappropriated as 
kickbacks to the officials in charge of overseeing the project. For example, in Herat province, 
76 Rubin, ​Afghanistan from the Cold War Through the War on Terror​, 351. 
77 Mashal, “Afghanistan Needs Billions in Aid.”  
78 Whitlock, “Built to Fail.”  
79 Dyer, “US Aid Fuelled Corruption.” 
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after an examination of 25 USAID-funded schools, the SIGAR found that only 23% of the total 
students enrolled were attending school.​80​ While some students simply might have gone 
unobserved due to absence, the greatness of this discrepancy indicates that the number of 
students enrolled was inflated to increase funding for the school that would wind up in the 
pockets of those who exaggerated the enrollment figures. Similarly, the Afghan military has been 
at the center of an even larger fraud. Between the Afghan National Defense Security Forces 
(ANDSF) and the Afghan National Army (ANA), a combined 35,000 soldiers and police were 
unaccounted for after the SIGAR attempted to verify troop numbers.​81​ Ghost salaries are often 
acquired by national and local level officials, although national officials are usually the ones to 
approve funding despite the doctored numbers, and are yet another crucial bond linking the 
national and sub-national forms of governance. Given the low salaries of government officials, 
lack of accountability, and unending funding, these schemes are wildly popular among Afghan 
politicians. 
Embezzlement has been made even simpler by the United States’ complex auditing 
procedures, which allows for billions of dollars to remain unaccounted.​82​ Riches hitherto 
unknown amongst Afghanistan’s elite are traded through negotiations unbeknownst to anyone 
but themselves for vanity projects and personal enrichment. President Karzai’s brother, 
Mahmoud Karzai, and his many business ventures provide one case study. His restoration of the 
unproductive Ghori cement factory, the opening of Afghanistan’s first Toyota dealership, and the 
80 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, “School in Herat Province.”  
81 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, “Report to United States Congress,” (2019). 
82 Reconstruction funds are split between the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and USAID. 
Some of the largest line items on the budget, as of 2020, are the Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), the 
Economic Support Fund (ESF), the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP), and International 
Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE). These various funds make centralizing information into one 
place difficult for auditors. This is not to mention the relationship between U.S. politicians and some of the private 
contractors employed by the U.S. government which might incentivize limiting the capabilities of auditors. For a 
comprehensive picture of how reconstruction funds are distributed view Appendix B of the following source: 
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, “Report to United States Congress,” (2020). 
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construction of the suburban oasis of Ayno Maina are all superfluous projects in a country that 
struggles to fulfill basic human needs. Although President Karzai has signaled his disapproval 
regarding some of these projects,​83​ Mahmoud’s ability to pursue unproductive pet projects with 
government favoritism is nepotism in its most brazen form. Yet these privileges belong to more 
than just the president’s direct family. Afghanistan’s national ministries have also been rife with 
underreported corruption among elites whose names frequently remain unknown to the public. 
Through the ministries, elites give preferential treatment to those with wealth or important 
connections to increase their wealth and power. This is succinctly pointed out by ​Khan Zaman 
Amarkhail, Chairman of the Afghan Anti-Corruption Network, in his condemnation of 
corruption within the Ministry of Mines and Petroleum:  
At least 100,000 USD has been taken as bribes for each mining contract to be given to 
their favorite people​84 
 
Similar corruption is common across government projects. The Sardar Mohammed Dawood 
Khan military hospital, described as the “crown jewel” of the Afghan health system,​85​ was the 
site of a $180 million embezzlement scandal conducted by officials involved in its construction 
and in which the complicity of American army commanders is widely alleged.​86​ Even the 
distribution of government scholarships to children living in orphanages has been a source of 
controversy, as those with connections to elites or to parents who were martyred working for the 
security services have been given undue preference.​87 
Afghanistan’s elites are free to pursue these corrupt practices largely as a result of their 
impunity. Through the layers of national bureaucracy and clever means of embezzlement, 
83 Trofimov, “Karzai Brothers Patch Up Property Dispute.”  
84 Jahanmal, “Report: Corruption Increases in Mines Ministry Contracts.”  
85 Wendle, “‘Auschwitz-like’ Afghan Military Hospital Investigation.” 
86 ​TOLO News​, “Afghan Military Hospital Says it Rejects Corruption.”  
87 Bashardost, “Corruption Alleged in Scholarships.” 
 
27 
holding particular individuals accountable is difficult, in general. Establishing a sufficient burden 
of proof and finding an impartial judge to try the case is seldom possible. Even when those 
responsible for corruption can be identified, the chance of punishment is marginal. This reality is 
most transparent in the scandal surrounding Kabul Bank, in which several high-level officials 
were implicated yet few faced repercussions.  
The Kabul Bank was founded in 2004 and celebrated as Afghanistan’s first private bank, 
but, in its inception, it illustrated the inability of Afghanistan’s political figures and nascent 
business community to remain separate. The bank originated with a $5,000 bribe to the 
Afghanistan Investment Support Agency to acquire the bank’s license.​88​ Led by Bank Chairman 
Sherkhan Farnood and CEO Khalil Ferozi, a former bodyguard of Farnood and fake currency 
trader, Kabul Bank’s list of influential shareholders consisted of major Afghan politicians and 
their relatives.​89​ After an investigation by the British-led Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF), the 
bank’s unethical practices were exposed. The bank’s shareholders were actively stealing 
depositor’s assets. Two sets of accounts were kept, one real and the other to fool regulators.​90 
Millions of dollars were embezzled from the bank through fake loans and investments to 
Afghanistan’s elite using fake companies, products paid for at inflated prices, and investments 
funneled into Dubai through Farnood’s Shaheen Exchange.​91​ Furthermore, the bank contributed 
hundreds of thousands of dollars to President Karzai’s 2009 reelection campaign and bribed 
members of parliament to turn a blind eye to their activities and to favor President Karzai’s 
agenda.​92​ When depositors became aware of the bank’s malpractice, they made a run on the 
88 While bribes are standard in Afghanistan’s ministries, Partlow in ​A Kingdom of Their Own​, claims that 
this bribe was considered exceptionally high and suggests that the bribe might have been to avoid scrutiny during 
the background checks of the bank’s business partners, which included current fugitives. 
89 Zaheer, and Siddiqui, “Kabul Bank’s Corrupt Shareholders Named.” 
90 McLeod, “Special Report.”  
91 McLeod, “Special Report.” 
92 Filkins, “The Afghan Bank Heist.” 
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bank, causing it to collapse and the Afghan government to take control of it. In total auditors 
discovered a sum unaccounted for of $930 million.​93 
Accountability for these missing funds was scarce. The Kabul Bank Special Tribunal 
(KBST), supported by President Ashraf Ghani, was intended to bring justice to millions of 
defrauded Afghans. Instead, its investigations were so limited in scope that most cases were 
ignored. Although Farnood identified 227 beneficiaries of corruption, including cases involving 
former vice presidents Marshal Fahim, Younis Qanooni, and Abdul Rashid Dostum, cases 
involving politically connected people were disproportionately sidelined.​94​ Of those on 
Farnood’s list, only the 62 people who willfully acknowledged their debts repaid them; the rest 
were ignored or recommended for investigations that usually did not take place.​95​ The tribunals 
that did take place were noted for their lack of witnesses, disproportionate sentences, and fast 
decisions, which some believe to have been made before hearings were even held.​96​ Aside from 
Farnood and Ferozi, who were both handed five-year sentences and multi-hundred million dollar 
fines, the KBST focused on minor actors in the scandal. Employees of Kabul Bank and Da 
Afghanistan Bank  —the nation’s central bank charged with overseeing financial activities— 
have been the main defendants for their role as accomplices or their role in impeding government 
investigations.​97​ However, even prison sentences have not been sufficient to alienate corrupt 
actors. While still serving his prison sentence, Khalil Ferozi was identified as a shareholder in 
the government-supported Smart City project and signed a memorandum of understanding with 
the Ministry of Urban Development.​98​ This arrangement was only terminated after public 
backlash grew too great. To date, the Kabul Bank case has been the largest corruption scandal in 
93 Strand, "Elite Capture of Kabul Bank," 180.  
94 McLeod, “Special Report.” 
95 McLeod, “Special Report.” 
96 McLeod, “Special Report.” 
97 McLeod, “Special Report.” 
98 ​Afghanistan Analysts Network, ​“The Afghan Government and the ‘Smart City’ Debacle.” 
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Afghanistan’s modern history. Yet, even the man at its helm had no problem finding new 
projects on which to partner with the government. Afghanistan’s culture of impunity is so 
thorough that participating in corruption comes at almost no cost to elites; this is important but 
only part of why corruption is so prevalent. 
National politics in Afghanistan has historically been governed by the necessity of 
placating the nation’s ethnic groups. In the past, this was done via a decentralized state structure 
where ethnic minorities could govern themselves as they wished with little opposition; 
unwelcome intrusions into rural life were successfully resisted. Because of the United States’ 
insistence on a strong national government that can combat terrorism, this way of governance is 
confined to the past. Despite this radical alteration of Afghanistan’s political structure, all major 
ethnic groups have bought into the new governing arrangements provided by the 2004 
constitution, even though it largely precludes non-Pashtuns from holding the extremely powerful 
position of president. What has united the elites of Afghanistan’s ethnic groups behind this 
government and allowed some to accept a fixed share of national power is the distribution of 
money and power. Through every step of the political and legal process, Afghanistan’s elites are 
provided the opportunity to enrich and protect themselves. They can scheme and trade favors for 
political positions, winning ministries and governorships for their friends and coethnic 
associates. They can use those positions to give and receive kickbacks through myriad methods 
of embezzlement using millions of dollars of poorly-tracked foreign aid. And, if caught, they can 
rest assured they will escape punishment, as everyone in government has a vested interest in 
ensuring that accountability never becomes the norm. The presence of corruption in Afghanistan 
is well-known among the country’s observers; what goes unnoticed is its function. Among 
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national politicians, corruption not only serves greed but it performs the function of the past, and 
now defunct, hegemonic narratives: facilitating ethnic cooperation and national stability. 
 
Chapter 4: ​Administrative Corruption: Extorting Those Below 
As outlined in Chapter 1, Afghanistan’s history is one of rebellion against authoritative 
governments. Yet aside from the Taliban, local power-holders have been docile toward national 
authority since the American intervention. So what precisely has prevented Afghanistan’s local 
power-holders —tribal chiefs, warlords, mullahs, drug traffickers, etc—from attempting to 
reassert the greater authority they held across the country before the American invasion? The 
answer lies in an implicit deal between national politicians and local strongmen. In exchange for 
accepting the national government’s authority over many issues, local strongmen are given free 
rein over their province. Using this power, local strongmen can retain much of their authority 
and enrich themselves, while enjoying the protection of ISAF and Afghan government soldiers. 
Local politicians and government employees are sidelined in this arrangement. Poor and 
under-resourced, they often turn to corruption and illegal arrangements to ensure their power and 
safety. The illegal methods through which government-backed strongmen and local politicians 
acquire wealth, commonly referred to as instances of administrative corruption, rarely make 
headlines but belong to the form of corruption that ordinary Afghans encounter regularly.  
The distinction between administrative corruption and political corruption may lead one 
to believe they are separate issues. In fact, administrative corruption is but a derivative of its 
political counterpart. The nature of political corruption, with its insulated multi-ethnic elite who 
require impunity, necessitates a disempowered and subservient local governing apparatus that 
cannot resist on behalf of frustrated local populations. For this reason, national officials tend to 
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underfund provincial and local governors and afford them poor salaries to limit their capabilities. 
Only through corruption can a local official consolidate his rule and sideline his rivals who might 
yield extraordinary informal power. Consequently, local officials contribute to the construction 
of hegemony through their own marginalization. Their lack of independent power allows 
national figures a monopoly on state-building. Local figures are left to the much simpler task of 
surviving, except for a few strongmen, often wielding power independently, that cooperate with 
the government and reap huge financial benefits for doing so. A hierarchy of corruption is 
thereby constructed. Local populations are left as the waiting victims of informal powerbrokers 
in the extralegal economy, underpaid low-level officials are left with few options but using their 
positions to extort the working poor, and the most fortunate strongmen rule with impunity as 
long as they remain loyal to the national government (See Figure 1).  




Many in the American national security community have acknowledged that mitigating 
the presence of administrative corruption is essential in getting Afghans to accept their 
government rather than informal actors.​99​ Under counterinsurgency strategy, General McChrystal 
emphasized the importance of winning “the 80 percent” of Afghans who supported neither their 
government nor the Taliban by reducing the graft of local administrators.​100​ Furthermore, this 
corruption has been described as “the biggest factor internal to Afghanistan harming the 
[international] Coalition’s campaign.”​101​ Yet reducing it has proved difficult, as it invades every 
sector of governmental activity. While performing mundane tasks such as registering a business, 
proving one’s claim to a plot of land, or even walking past police, paying extortive bribes is 
often the only way forward. As President Ashraf Ghani noted in the 2009 book he co-authored: 
Making headway most often requires a bribe. In Afghanistan in 2002 a citizen had to pay 
$8 in bribes, almost half the monthly wage, to obtain the twenty signatures required from 
functionaries spread out across the city and to fill out twenty-four pages of 
documentation, consuming as much as a week of that person’s life — all for the 
“pleasure” of paying a $2 customs fee.​102 
 
These bribes are particularly harmful to Afghanistan’s poorest citizens, who spend the largest 
portion of their incomes paying bribes for services that are supposed to be free.​103​ As a result, 
poor Afghans are marginalized from the formal economy. In large numbers, they are forced to 
turn to the extralegal economy, consisting largely of unregistered businesses and properties, drug 
trafficking, and poppy cultivation, which begets even greater corruption, as only informal actors 
99 Because of this, it may at first appear that corruption is ipso facto working against the goal of building 
hegemony. This would be a misperception. Rather, hegemony is built among leaders in Afghanistan. As long as 
leaders do not rebel (and they are incentivized not to, as discussed in Chapter 3), the populations below them can be 
freely coerced. However, when disgruntled civilians turn to the Taliban, this does provide a challenge to government 
hegemony. This is why corruption has been of concern to some within the U.S. military, most notably Admiral 
Michael Mullen. 
100 Chayes, ​Thieves of State​, 30. 
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can enforce legitimate, although not legally recognized, property rights.​104​ As of 2007, only 
about 10 percent of economic activity was within the formal taxable economic system while 
almost half of the economy was based on illegal narcotics trading.​105​ While the 90% of the 
economy that goes untaxed is inaccessible to the government, warlords are able to tax and 
regulate this shadow economy with coercion and other illegitimate means. The consequence is a 
broken social contract in which citizens are forced into the chaos of the informal system due to 
the expense and monotony of formal government procedures. 
While administrative corruption is harshest on the most vulnerable, the line between 
oppressor and victim is far less clear than in the realm of national politics. Many local politicians 
and administrators, due to the limited resources and salaries provided by Kabul, face severe 
economic anxiety. As of 2002, the salary of the average Afghan civil servant was, at $28 per 
month, just below the nation’s poverty line.​106​ During the same year, ministers received 
approximately $40 per month and supreme court judges received $80 per month.​107​ These low 
salaries for highly-skilled and important jobs incentivize misbehavior and poor job performance. 
As Shamsullah Jawid, former head of the Anti-Corruption Unit of Northern Afghanistan points 
out, the main reasons for corruption among local officials include low pay, lack of job security, 
unemployment among family members, and a lack of confidence in the country’s political 
future.​108​ This class of civil servants is also the most politically vulnerable, often treated with 
disdain by the Taliban and as potential rivals by the national government. As a result, Afghan 
governors often face assassination attempts and are forced, like the poor, to rely upon the 
informal powerbrokers from whom they are ostensibly providing an alternative. Afghan 
104 De Soto, ​The Mystery of Capital​, 153-162. 
105 Hamid, "Endangered Livelihoods,” 103-115. 
106 Chesterman, "Walking Softly in Afghanistan,” 43. 
107 Chesterman, "Walking Softly in Afghanistan,” 43. 
108 Habib, "Local Government in Afghanistan,” 1-16. 
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governors who align themselves with these informal actors tend to counter insurgency and 
terrorist activities more efficiently than those who meet Western ideals of “professionalism,” 
which includes impartiality toward local affairs and professional competence.​109​ For local 
government officials, corruption bridges the wide gap within their jobs between risk and reward. 
Connections with informal actors provide cash and security where they are otherwise scarce. 
Contemporary analyses of corruption at the subnational level tend to highlight the 
importance of profession rather than class, but given the commonality of issues between 
professions in the civil service sector, this seems a mistake. Governors, police, and local 
administrators all find themselves in the precarious position of being underfunded and 
endangered; their actions are all similar in principle and only differ due to the administrative 
tools at their disposal. Police, for example, have a notorious reputation for corruption. In 2006, 
the Afghanistan Highway Police (AHP), charged with defending the country’s major roadways, 
were phased out entirely due in part to their insistence on bribes,​110​ likewise, the much larger 
Afghan National Police (ANP) are well-known for their “arrest, bribe, release” shakedown. 
Following this formula, citizens are arbitrarily arrested and detained, beaten, at times even 
tortured, and subsequently released upon paying the demanded bribe.​111​ Similarly, the Afghan 
National Security Forces, in charge of poppy eradication, also extract bribes from farmers hoping 
to avoid the chemical spraying of their crops. This bond between poppy cultivators and 
authorities is continually strengthened as the market is consolidated when those who cannot 
afford to pay bribes are forced out.​112​ Even the educational sector is rife with corruption. USAID 
has noted that the low salaries received by teachers lead them to prioritize private tutoring and 
109 Englehart, and Grant, "Governors, Governance, and Insurgency,” 299-324. 
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111 Wilder, ​Cops or Robbers? 
112 Rubin, ​Afghanistan from the Cold War Through the War on Terror​, 396.  
 
35 
receiving bribes for grades rather than school attendance and public instruction.​113​ Countless 
locally-administered professions could be accounted for here; what these professions share is 
their need to leverage what little power they have to elicit bribes on which they can sustain 
themselves.  
The most powerful participants in local governing arrangements are the warlords and 
local strongmen. These figures, typically the same actors who were prominent in the anarchic 
pre-invasion period, have often enjoyed the monopoly of force in their regions of the country for 
decades. Due to their large armies and lack of organized opposition, the national government has 
chosen to co-opt these warlords as partners in their state-building efforts rather than cast them 
aside. As a result, warlords have often worked in concert with national officials, respecting 
national priorities and working within the structures of government, creating the situation scholar 
Dipaly Mukhopadhyay has called “warlord as bureaucrat.”​114​ These warlords often work in 
collaboration with U.S. and NATO forces as well. For example, Gul Agha Sherzai (in Kandahar) 
and Jan Muhammad Khan (in Uruzgan) were long known to provide combat assistance to U.S. 
forces and help them eliminate “Taliban” from their region, a label they conveniently applied to 
their rivals.​115​ These rivals, often amenable to U.S. and Afghan government interests, could then 
be captured and detained for years in the Guantanamo Bay detention camp, where they would be 
deemed enemy combatants, tortured, and denied rights to a trial or hearings.​116​ The elimination 
of these rivals centralized power at the provincial level, ensuring that the Afghan government 
and American military had only one strongman to coordinate with, rather than needing to win the 
consent of the entire population living under him. Despite this unity between local strongmen, 
113 United States Agency for International Development, “Assessment of Corruption.” 
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the Afghan government, and the United States, strongmen retain significant informal connections 
that allow them to act with absolute freedom. Their relationships with local militias allow them 
to occupy land and then charge the owners rent to return.​117​ They are also frequently involved in 
drug trafficking and transport mafias and appropriate a significant share of national funds for 
themselves through overt corruption and the collection of bribes from the civil service class.​118​ In 
essence, Afghanistan’s warlords and strongmen have played a peculiar role in the political 
economy, as they are the only actors organized enough to legitimately challenge the state from 
within. While warlords have played a role in state-building, largely through their compliance 
with the national government, they are often noted for their destructive role in the perpetuation of 
corruption that delegitimizes the state.​119​ Regardless, the Afghan government has had no choice 
but to tolerate the warlords, otherwise, they risk provoking them into joining the insurgency or 
undermining government authority to a greater extent than they already do. The current 
impossibility of eliminating warlords as a class poses a major challenge to opponents of 
administrative corruption. 
Through its inter-class character, administrative corruption implicates all levels of local 
society. Each class can expect to pay bribes or cede authority to those above them and receive 
bribes or deference from those below them. This structure most harms the poor, as bribes are 
extracted from them while they receive only access to limited basic services in return. They are 
also often faced with the steepest bribes relative to their already meager income. This is, in part, 
a result of the civil service class attempting to extract from them an amount capable of fulfilling 
their own needs like compensating for paying the bribes requested by local strongmen. 
Strongmen have accrued even greater benefits than during their days of pre-invasion anarchy. 
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The arrival of a state apparatus has provided even more ways to extort bribes from those in need 
of state services and the nation’s civil service workers. The civil service class finds itself on both 
sides of corruption, as its victim and its perpetrator. These poorly paid Afghans often act out of 
perceived necessity rather than greed, trying to subsidize their pittance of a salary. This hierarchy 
illuminates a crucial dynamic. Local actors are left to fend for themselves while those with 
regional strength and connections are rewarded for their compliance with the national 
government. Thus, the primary purpose of administrative corruption is to co-opt potential 
opposition and marginalize the lower classes in Afghan society, leaving state-building efforts to 
the national elites. While the labels ‘political corruption’ and ‘administrative corruption’ define 
different phenomena, they are both the consequence of the national government attempting to 
maintain and build its hegemony without the traditional ideological narratives that once played a 
more significant role in persuading Afghans to submit to their rulers. 
 
Conclusion 
Mahatma Gandhi once instructed his countrymen to “imagine the whole nation, 
vivisected and torn into pieces; how could it be made into a nation?”​120​ While he was speaking of 
the neighboring Indian subcontinent, this challenge of imagination has been the task of Afghans 
for centuries. Historically, Afghan nation-building was the product of varying amounts of 
coercion, patrimonial exchange, and celebrated cultural narratives that arose over centuries of 
stubborn independence and resistance to authority. These narratives included traditions recalling 
the nation’s piety as an Islamic territory, its resistance to foreign occupation, its long-respected 
monarchy, and its tribal jirgas. For centuries, Afghanistan’s elites returned to these familiar 
narratives, along with exchange and coercion, to legitimize their rule in times of uncertainty. 
120 Sen, ​Identity and Violence​, 169. 
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The American invasion ended this state of affairs by destroying the usability of 
Afghanistan’s centuries-long cultural narratives for the political elite. This reduced the state’s 
legitimacy and forced elites to rely on heavier doses of corruption to induce cooperation and trust 
between one another. An abundance of foreign aid has expanded the level of corruption to an 
unprecedented scale and allowed the national government to successfully co-opt enough of its 
potential opposition. Every resource of the state —power, jobs, land, foreign aid, special 
projects, administrative positions— has become a bargaining chip for Afghan elites. This is the 
paradoxical nature of Afghan corruption; while holding the state together by uniting elites, it 
simultaneously delegitimizes the state through the resentment it conjures among local 
populations. As long as aid continues to flow and co-opted strongmen dominate provincial 
politics, this state of affairs is sustainable although far from ideal. 
Due to the massive powers granted to the national government by the 2004 constitution, 
political corruption perpetrated by national elites ultimately drives the structure of Afghanistan’s 
federal system and corruption networks. National officials, particularly the office of the 
president, carefully manage local politics, maintaining their power by keeping local officials 
dependent and loyal. Administrative corruption is a byproduct of this political structure. 
Government-aligned strongmen and powerful warlords extort those working in the civil service 
sector who are in turn forced to prey upon the working poor. In this relationship, acts of 
corruption by one class are the necessitated product of the actions of the immediately superior 
class. This chain of causality always refers back to the national government.  
If corruption is to be overcome, it must be confronted nationally rather than locally and 
understood as the result of the degradation of Afghanistan's nationally-unifying ideology rather 
than simply culture or greed. As long as coercion remains an unacceptable means of unifying the 
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nation, only ideological approaches to nation-building can fill the hegemonic vacuum now 
occupied by systemic corruption.​121​ While many scholars have proposed complex technocratic 
agendas to confront corruption, Afghanistan’s history provides its own solution. This solution is 
one of narrative, custom, pride, and tradition. Although imperfect, it has united Afghanistan 
more than any foreign power ever could; reviving this history rather than fighting it is essential 
















121 The amount of coercion needed to significantly reduce corruption would be astronomical. Not only 
would it need to destroy the Taliban insurgency and other potential rivals to the government, it would need to punish 
corrupt actors with sufficient consistency. This approach was, in essence, the Taliban’s strategy to end corruption in 
provinces where it enjoyed no ideological sympathy. If Afghanistan is ever to enjoy a period of relative peace or 
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